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II.
~

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3- I 02(3)(j).
111.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the district court correctly determine that Uintah County lacked

authority to tax the Jordans' severed mineral estate in the Property? (R. 302.)
The standard of review is correctness. Keith v. Mountain Resorts Dev., 2014 UT
32, ~ 16,337 P.2d 213.
2.
·.a

Did the district court correctly determine that the severed mineral rights

were not included in the May 2000 tax sale because they were not assessed or levied by
Uintah County? (R. 302.)
The standard of review is correctness. Keith, 2014 UT 32, ~ 16.
3.

Did the district court correctly determine that the lack of notice to the

Jordans of the May 2000 tax sale violated due process and rendered the 2000 tax deed to
..J

Quality Remediation Services, Inc. ("QRS") void, to the extent such deed could have
transferred the Jordans' mineral estate? (R. 1689.)
The standard of review is correctness. Keith, 2014 UT 32, ~ 16.
4.

Did the district court correctly determine that the wrongful removal of ore

statute, Utah Code Ann.§ 40-1-12, does not apply to oil and gas production? (R. 168.)
The standard of review is correctness. America West Bank_, L.C. v. State, 2014 UT
49, ~ 7,342 P.3d 224.

I

IV.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution, attached as Exhibit A to the
Addendum.
Article XIII, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution, attached as Exhibit B to the Addendum.
Article XIII, Section 2( 1) of the Utah Constitution, attached as Exhibit C to the
Addendum.
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, attached as Exhibit D to the Addendum.
Utah Code Ann.§ 59-2-102, attached as Exhibit E to the Addendum.
Utah Code Ann.§ 59-2-201, attached as Exhibit F to the Addendum.
Utah Code Ann. § 40-1-12, attached as Exhibit G to the Addendum.
Utah Code Ann.§ 40-6-9, attached as Exhibit H to the Addendum.

V.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in Court
Below.

The Appellees, James Harvey Jordan et al., (the "Jordans") filed a complaint to
quiet title to the mineral rights in the Property against Eddie R. and Ly-Thi Jensen (the
"Jensens") on July 3, 2013. (R. 1.) On August 9, 2013, the Jensens filed an answer and
counterclaim, which included claims for declaratory judgment, quiet title, adverse
possession, wrongful removal of ores, conversion, and trespass. (R. 23.)
The Jordans moved to dismiss the J ensens' wrongful removal of ore claim on
August 23, 2013. (R. 49.) The district court granted the motion and dismissed that claim
on November 13, 2013. (R. 166.)

2

On December 12, 2013, the J ensens amended their counterclaim to assert claims
against Appellees Axia Energy, LLC ("Axia"), Stonegate Resources, LLC ("Stonegate"),
and Wasatch Oil & Gas, LLC ("Wasatch"). Against these parties, the Jensens asserted
claims for declaratory judgment, quiet title, trespass, conversion, and the previously
dismissed wrongful removal of ore claim. (R. 175.)
After the close of discovery, on January 7, 2014, Axia, the Jordans, Stonegate, and
Wasatch filed motions for summary judgment. (R. 257--445.) On March 10, 2014, the
Jensens filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on its claim for declaratory
~

judgment, quiet title, and adverse possession. (R. 539.)
The Jensens' adverse possession claim was dismissed pursuant to stipulation on
May 6, 2014, (R. 1651-52), and the Jensens' remaining claims were dismissed through
summary judgment. During the September 24, 2014 hearing on the summary judgment
motions, the parties' counsel agreed that the material facts were not in dispute. (R. 2010,

..
/1
,...i,,

8-12.) On February 18, 2015, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Axia, the Jordans, Stonegate, and Wasatch, and it denied the J ensens' motion for
summary judgment. (R. 1816.)

B.

Statement of Facts

On October 25, 1954, title to the surface and the minerals in the subject property
(the "Property"), consisting of about 40 acres in Uintah County, Utah, vested in Olivia
Jordan, Marie Robertson, and Caroline Kelley. (R. 317.) On February 3, 1995, Olivia
Jordan, Marie Robertson, and Caroline Kelley conveyed the surface interests of the
Property to Jonathan Anthony Andrews, expressly and intentionally reserving all of the

3

oil, gas, and other minerals. (R. 319.) Since that severance, Olivia Jordan, Marie
Robertson, Caroline Kelley, and their successors in interest ( collectively, the "Jordans")
have at all times claimed to own the mineral rights and have actively issued oil and gas
leases associated with those rights, giving repeated public notice of their continuing
claim. (R. 236, iJ 18.) Until 2013, there had been no cha11enge to their ownership.
(R. 369-376~)
In May, 2011, Stonegate Resources, LLC ("Stonegate") leased the mineral rights
in the Property from the Jordans. (R. 393--421.) On August 1, 2011, Stonegate assigned
the right to explore and produce the mineral rights to Axia, reserving an overriding
royalty interest, a portion of which was later conveyed to Wasatch Oil & Gas, LLC
("Wasatch"). (R. 423--428.)
On November 7, 2011, Axia entered into a Surface Use Agreement and Grant of
Easements with the surface owners, Appellants, Eddie R. Jensen and Ly-Thi Jensen (the
"Jensens"), and under that agreement, Axia has paid the Jensens $21,182. (R. 430.) Axia
has also paid all of the taxes associated with the mineral rights for 2012 and 2013, 1 which
total $84,878.32. (R. 311, 15.)
Axia began drilling a well on the Property in September, 2012, and the well was
completed and began producing oil and gas in November, 2012. Although the Jordans
had executed numerous leases for the mineral rights over the years, Axia' s 2012 well
marked the first time anyone had attempted to produce oil and gas or other minerals from
1

The tax payments for 2014 and 2015 are not part of the record because those payments
had not yet been made as of the September 24, 2014 hearing on the summary judgment
motions.
4

C·.
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the Jordans' mineral estate. Despite having observed Axia drill its well on the Property,
the J ensens never mentioned their claim to the mineral rights to Axia or anyone else until
after they received a March 29, 2013 letter from the Jordans' lawyer. (R. 278.)
On March 29, 2013, the Jordans' counsel sent a letter to the Jensens asking them
to sign a mineral rights quitclaim deed and explaining that if the J ensens were unwilling
to sign the deed, the Jordans would be compelled to file a quiet title action. (Id.) Prior to
their receipt of the letter, the Jensens never mentioned to Axia or anyone else that they
owned the mineral rights to the Property. (Id.) In fact, they claimed the opposite in a
vJ

Real Property Transfer Survey Standard Land Questionnaire in January, 2001. (R. 244.)
Therein, the Jensens indicated that their purchase of the Property included no mineral
rights. (Id.) Eddie Jensen testified that the reason the J ensens purchased the Property in

v;)

2000 was to build a home. (R. 357.) After the March 29, 2013 letter, however, the
Jensens decided to make a claim for the mineral rights. (R. 278.)
The J ensens' claim originates from a Uintah County tax sale. The J ensens argue
that Uintah County seized the severed mineral rights, along with the surface rights, for
unpaid taxes and sold them in a tax sale to an intermediary, who then sold the Property to
the Jensens.
After the February, 1995 severance of the mineral rights, the new surface owner,
..J

Jonathan Anthony Andrews, apparently failed to pay the county property taxes for the
1995, 1998, and 1999 tax years-resulting in a past due amount of$167.19. (R. 343-

v)

344.) Importantly, no taxes were due on the severed mineral interests, inasmuch as the
County did not assess the mineral interests. (R. 242, , 7.) Uintah County leaves mineral

5

interests for the Utah Tax Commission to assess. (R. 241-242, 16.) On May 25, 2000,
Uintah County seized the surface owner's interest in the Property and sold it to Quality
Remediation Service, Inc. ("QRS"). (R. 34 7.) At the tax sale, QRS paid $6,000 for its
interest in the Property. (Id.) In December, 2000, the Jensens purchased the Property
from QRS for $5,500. (R. 244.)
The tax sale to QRS could not have included the Jordans' severed mineral estate.
Uintah County's levy and assessment for the 1995 tax year did not occur until on or after
May 12, 1995, months after the February 3, 1995 severance of the mineral rights from the
surface interests. (R. 241, 15 and 247, 15.) In the testimony of its assessor, Uintah
County indicated that when the County conducts its assessments, it does not assess
mineral rights and, specifically, that it did not assess the mineral rights associated with
the Property in its 1995 assessment. (R. 242, 1 7.) In its publicly recorded tax lien,
Uintah County indicated that date on which the lien attached to the Property was

January 16, 1996, well after the February 3, 1995 severance of the mineral rights.
(R. 343.) It is undisputed that Uintah County did not provide any notice to the Jordans of
the 1995 assessment, the delinquency, or the tax sale. (R. 2010, 17:13-16.)

VI.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This case turns on whether the 2000 tax deed could have passed the mineral estate

to QRS, the Jensens' predecessor in interest. The district court found that such tax deed
could not have transferred the mineral estate, for two reasons. First, applying
well-established precedent that a taxing entity may seize and sell for delinquent taxes
only the property interests assessed, the court found that Uintah County had not assessed

6

the severed mineral estate in its 1995 assessment. Second, the district court found that, if
the 2000 tax deed could have transferred the Jordans' mineral interests, the deed would
be void because Uintah County never gave constitutionally required notice to the Jordans
of the tax sale. The district court was correct on both counts.
Here, it is undisputed that Uintah Cow1ty did not assess the mineral rights.
Inasmuch as a tax sale includes only those rights which are actually assessed, the mineral
·~

rights in the Property were not included in the May 2000 tax sale.
To overcome the fact that the County had not, in fact, assessed the severed mineral
vJJ

interests in 1995, the Jensens argued, as they do on appeal, that the 1995 assessment must
be deemed to have included the mineral interest. The Jensens offer two alternative
grounds for their position: (a) counties are authorized to assess severed mineral interests,
so long as those interests are undeveloped and non-producing; and (b) Uintah County's
assessment must be deemed to have occurred on January 1 of the 1995 tax year, which
was prior to the severance of the mineral estate, when the surface and mineral estates
were combined. The district correctly rejected these arguments.
There is no basis for the Jensens' contention that counties are empowered to assess
severed mineral interests and no evidence that a county assessment of mineral interests
has ever occurred. The district court correctly held that the County lacked authority to
assess the severed mineral interests because the authority to assess such interests has been
granted exclusively to the Utah State Tax Commission. The Jensens' argument that the
counties may assess severed mineral estates when they lack value fails. If property lacks
value, it may not be taxed at all. Second, the Jensens' notion that mineral interests lack
7

value just because they are undeveloped and non-producing is not something this Court
should endorse.
The Jensens' alternative argument-that January 1, 1995 is the dale on which to
determine whether the County could assess and levy taxes against the Property-fares no
better. In several controlling decisions, this Court has held that the time lo determine
whether a taxing entity has the power to assess and levy taxes against a property interest
is the date on which the entity exercises that authority. In 1995, Uintah County
undertook its assessment in May. At that time, the mineral estate had been severed from
the Property, and thus outside the County's taxing authority.
Even if the mineral rights were included in the tax sale, the complete failure to
give the J ordans notice of the tax sale violated due process and rendered the tax deed
void, at least as to the severed mineral estate. It is fundamental that a citizen's property
rights cannot be extinguished by the government without notice and an opportunity to be
heard. Adequate notice of a tax sale is essential to satisfy due process. The district court
correctly held that, if the 2000 tax deed could have passed the Jordans' mineral interests,
it would be void because the J ordans were given no notice of the tax sale.
The district court also correctly dismissed the J ensens' wrongful removal of ore
claim. First, the Jensens' wrongful removal of ore claim is predicated on their ownership
of the mineral estate associated with the Property, which they do not own, for the above
reasons. Second, the wrongful removal of ore statute does not apply to oil and gas.
Production of oil and gas is governed by Title 40, Chapter 6 of the Utah Code. Third, the

8

term "ore" does not include oil and gas, as ore is the source rock from which oil and gas
is extracted, not the oil and gas itself.

VII.

ARGUMENT

A.

Uintah County's 1995 General Property Assessment Did Not And
Could Not Include The Mineral Estate.

The district court's first basis for finding that the 2000 tax deed transferred only
the surface estate associated with the Property, and not the Jordans' mineral interest, is its
conclusion that Uintah Cow1ty had not validly assessed the severed mineral interest with
its 1995 assessment. Uintah County could only seize for delinquent taxes the property
interest it actually assessed. "Tax sale proceedings are predicated and founded upon
failure to pay a tax assessed against the property, and therefore no validity can attach to
..J

any sale except of the property assessed and delinquent for failure to pay the tax levied on
the assessment as made." Tintic Undine lvlining Co. v. Ercanbrack, 74 P .2d 1184, 1189
(Utah 193 8). "If property rights which are not included in an assessment are sold or
extinguished by a tax sale, there would be a taking of property without due process of
law." Hayes v. Gibbs, 169 P.2d 781, 786 (Utah 1946). Inasmuch as Uintah County.did

,,;p

not actually assess the mineral interests associated with the Property, it could not have
transferred such interest with its 2000 tax deed.
Recognizing that Uintah County did not actually assess the severed mineral
interest, the Jensens make two arguments. First, they argue that the assessment should
have included mineral interests. The Jensens argue that Uintah County's assessment

must be deemed to have included the severed mineral interests because, they insist,

9

counties are empowered to assess severed mineral interests prior to when they go into
production. Second, the Jensens argue that the County's assessment relates back to the
statutory tax lien date, January 1, 1995, when the surface and mineral estates were still
combined. Both arguments lack merit for several reasons.

1.

The assessment that Uintah County should have made is
irrelevant; the assessment "as made" is controlling.

The Jensens' first argument defies Tintic, under which "no validity can attach to
any sale except of the property assessed and delinquent for failure to pay the tax levied on
the assessment as made." Tintic Undine Mining Co., 14 P.2d at 1189 (emphasis added).
According to the Uintah County Assessor, its 1995 assessment-"as made"-did not
include the severed mineral interest. (R. 242, 17.) The district court found that "Uintah
County does not attempt to determine a value or apply a tax rate to severed mineral
interests" and does not "send separate tax bills, notices, or notices of sales to owners of
severed mineral interests." (R. 1824-1825.) Because Uintah County did not actually
assess the severed mineral interest, it was not conveyed in the May 2000 tax sale.

2.

Uintah County Did Not Have the Authority to Tax or Seize the
Severed Mineral Interest.

Uintah County was correct to not assess the J ordans' mineral interest because it
lacked the necessary constitutional and statutory authority. The authority to tax mineral
interests has been granted exclusively to the Utah State Tax Commission.

10

a.

The Utah State Tax Commission Has Exclusive Authority
to Tax Minerals.

Property taxes for surface and mineral interests in Utah are assessed and levied
separak:ly, with the counties taxing the surface, an<l the Commission taxing the minerals.

See Utah Code Ann.§§ 59-2-201 and 59-5-102 et seq. This Court has repeatedly
recognized and upheld this bifurcated tax structure. See Telonis v. Staley, 144 P.2d 513,
515 (Utah 1943) ("Where there is separate ownership of the respective rights [referring to
severed surface and mineral rights], separate levy and separate sale would necessarily
follow ...."); Kanawha & Hocking Coal & Coke Co. v. Carbon County, 535 P.2d 1139,
1140 (Utah 1975) (holding that counties tax the surface rights, and the Utah State Tax
Commission taxes the mineral rights).
The Tax Commission's authority to assess mineral interests is exclusive. The
Utah Constitution mandates that "[t]he State Tax Commission shall: ... (b) assess
mines." Art. XIII, §6(3)(b). Likewise, Utah's Property Tax Act (the "Act") dictates that
"all mines and mining claims" are centrally assessed by the Commission. Utah Code
Ann. § 59-2-20l(l)(a)(v). The Act defines a "mine" as "a natural deposit of either
metalliferous or nonmetalliferous valuable mineral," and '" [n]onmetalliferous minerals'
includes ... oil [and] gas." Utah Code Ann.§ 59-2-102(24), (27). Neither the Utah
Constitution nor the Act contain any exception to the Commission's exclusive authority
to assess minerals.
The Jensens argue that the authority to tax minerals has been granted to the
counties. This position is contrary to Utah law. This Court has held that the Legislature
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is constitutionally prohibited from conferring mineral assessment authority on any entity
other than the Commission. Kennecott Corp. v. Salt l,ake Cnu.nty, 702 P.2d 451, 457
(l Jtah I 9R5).

Here, the mineral interest wa" severed from the surface estate on February 3, 1995.
After this severance, Uintah County lacked the authority to assess or levy real property
taxes on the mineral interest. Without the authority to assess or levy taxes on the severed
mineral interest, Uintah County could not have seized or sold it for delinquent taxes.
The Jensens urge the Court to create an exception to the Commission's exclusive
constitutional and statutory authority. They argue that, inasmuch as the Commission's
exclusive authority extends only to "valuable" minerals, that leaves for the counties
minerals that lack value, which the Jensens equate with non-producing oil and gas
interests. The district court rejected the Jensens' argument, holding that "undeveloped or
undiscovered minerals underlying a piece of property are akin to an intangible asset" that
is "not subject to taxation." (R. 1825.) The district court was correct.

b.

Property Without Value Cannot be Taxed.

The Jensens contend that the Commission's authority only extends to ''valuable"
mineral interests and that non-producing interests lack value. Even if non-producing
mineral interests lack value, a dubious proposition at best, that would not mean that
non-producing mineral interests can be taxed by the counties. Instead, that would mean
that non-producing mineral interests cannot be taxed at all. If a mineral interest lacks
value, then it may not be assessed at all. Only "tangible property" is subject to
assessment, and "tangible property, for tax purposes, has a physical aspect and has value
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in and of itself." Salt Lake City S. R.R. Co. v. State Tax Comm 'n, 1999 UT 90, ,I 9,987
P .2d 594 ( emphasis added). Furthermore, Utah law provides that property is to be
assessed in proportion to its value. See Utah Const. Art. XIII,§ 2(1); Utah Code Ann.

§ 59-2-102(29)(a). If mineral interests lack value, because they are non-producing, they
are considered to be intangible property, which cannot be taxed by either the Commission
or the counties.

c.

The Jensens' Reliance on the "Discovery Standard" From
the Federal Mining Law of 1872 to Determine Whether
Minerals Have Value is Flawed.

To ascertain whether a mineral interest has value to bring it within the
Commission's exclusive authority, the Jensens advance the "discovery standard," a test
developed to determine whether lands were patentable under the Federal Mining Law of
1872. According to the Jensens, the same "discovery standard" should be used to
determine whether a mineral interest has value for purposes of whether the Commission
,..i)

has authority over such interest. Even if a test based on the "discovery standard" could
be fashioned to determine whether a mineral deposit is ''valuable," and thus subject to the
Commission's authority, why doesn't the "discovery standard" also determine whether
the mineral deposit has ''value" necessary for any taxation?
The "discovery standard" is the proverbial square peg in a round hole. The
"discovery standard" was never intended to mark the delineation point between central
and local tax assessment, as the J ensens suggest. Indeed, the Federal Mining Law of

.d)

1872 has nothing whatsoever to do with the taxation of mineral deposits. Instead, it
"provides ... that citizens may enter and explore the public domain and,
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if they find

valuable rnineral deposits, may obtain title to the land on which such deposits are
located." U.S. v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599,600 n.1 (1968) (emphasis added) (citing 30
U.S.C. § 22). The "discovery standard" is triggered by ''the discovery of the [deposits']
vein or lode within the limits of the claim located." 30 U.S.C. § 23. The "discovery
standard" was devised to determine whether a citizen has found mineral deposits so that
they can acquire the property and exclude the public from the land.
In contrast, the Utah Act's provisions governing the Commission's assessment of
minerals do not condition such assessment upon "the discovery of the [deposits'] vein or
lode." Nor does Commission assessment of mineral deposits effectuate a transfer of the
property containing the deposits. The purpose for the "discovery standard" makes it
inapplicable in the context of determining whether a mineral deposit should be assessed
G

centrally or locally.

d.

The System of Taxation Described By the Jensens Does
Not Exist and Could Not Be Implemented.

The standard the Jensens advance to delineate the line between County and
Commission assessment of mineral interests is unworkable, especially when the
"discovery standard" is applied as enacted. The Jensens argue that "the event that
triggers assessment by the Commission (i.e., the point at which an oil and gas interest is
deemed valuable for assessment purposes) is production." In reality, the "discovery
standard" does not require production and can be satisfied by a "reasonable prospect of
success." (Id. (quoting Castle, 19 LD 455) (emphasis added).) Thus, the "discovery
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standard" does not support the trigger for Commission assessment that the J ensens
advance.
Even if this taxing authority did exist, it would be unworkable in practice. The
Jensens have cited no statutes or rules implementing the counties' taxing authority over
non-producing minerals. Surely, if this taxing authority had been delegated to the
counties by the Utah Constitution and the Act, there would be statutes and rules directing
how these taxes are to be assessed and levied, as there are with all of the other taxing
authority granted to the counties and the Commission. Yet none exist.
The Jensens' approach raises more questions than answers. The Jensens have not
explained whether a cessation in production from an existing well converts the mineral
interest back to nonproducing status that is subject to county assessment, or whether the
land is irrevocably deemed to be a producing property in perpetuity. They have not
explained whether production of one mineral, such as oil and gas, alleviates the county
from the burden of taxing the remaining minerals, such as gold, silver, or coal, that are
still not being produced.

e.

Requiring Counties to Tax Non-Producing Mineral
Interests Would Invalidate Existing Property Rights.

In a last-ditch effort to sway this Court to create a new exception to Commission
authority for non-producing mineral interests, the Jensens surmise that, if the county
lacks the authority to tax the mineral interests, "most tax sales would actually create a
severed estate where the delinquent owners retained the minerals [putting] ownership of
mineral rights in doubt for any property that has been subject to a tax sale." This simply
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is not true. The collective property rights in land have been described as a bundle of
sticks. See Frank Lyon Co. v. U.S., 435 U.S. 561,570 (1978). Any conveyance of the
property would include all of the sticks held by the grantor, unless either the granting
document indicates otherwise. 2 So too with the tax deed, which would convey all of the
sticks held by the owner of the property against whom the assessment is made.
When it comes to disruption and frustration of expectations, nothing holds a
candle to the system the Jensens advance. The district court recognized the harm that
would result if the Jensens' position were implemented:
Following Jensen's reasoning [that Uintah County assessed the nonproducing oil and gas interests], severed unproductive mineral interests
have unknowingly passed at numerous tax sales. Because Uintah County
does not notify owners of severed mineral interests of assessments or tax
sales, it is likely that many owners of severed mineral interests find
themselves in an identical position to the Jordans.

(R. 1825.) The resulting economic fallout-from the loss of investment capital
expending in drilling the wells to the forfeiture of royalties realized by severed mineral
owners-would be financially devastating. Vast amounts of revenue, both past and
present, would shift from the severed mineral interest owners to surface owners. In
addition, the counties, suddenly tasked with locating and valuing non-producing mineral
interests, would be required to invent a method for valuing undiscovered mineral
interests, a difficult, if not impossible, undertaking that the oil and gas industry, with their
billions of dollars in exploration, has failed to perfect. The Jensens position, though

2

Contrary to the Jensens' assertion, a conveyance of the property rights of one owner,
acquired through assessment of that owner's interest, would not operate to convey those
sticks not held by that owner, such as a previously severed mineral interest.
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beneficial to their claims in this case, would have far-reaching and potentially devastating
consequences.
3.

Uintah County lacked authority to seize and sell the severed
mineral interest because, when the County exercised its
assessment and levy authority, the mineral interest had been
severed from the Property, removing it from the County's taxing
authority.

The Jensens' fall-back is their argument that Uintah County's assessment relates
back to January 1, when the surface and mineral estates associated with the Property were
combined. However, the date on which to determine whether a taxing entity may
exercise its assessment authority over a property interest is not January 1, as the J ensens
argue. In decision after decision, this Court has held that the time to determine whether a
taxing entity has the power to assess and levy taxes against a particular property interest
is the time at which the assessment and levy power is exercised. If on the date of
assessment and levy, the property interest is within the taxing entity's jurisdiction, the
taxing entity may validly assess and levy its tax on the interest. If, on the other hand, the
subject property interest is outside the taxing entity's jurisdiction when the entity
conducts is assessment and levy, the entity lacks authority to assess and levy taxes on it,
regardless of the property's status on the statutory lien date.
In Gillmor v. Dale, this Court addressed whether city property taxes were owed on
land that had been removed from the city's boundaries after the statutory tax lien date but
before the city's assessment and levy. See 75 P. 932 (Utah 1904). As portrayed in the
timeline below, the city's assessment date was July 28, 1902, and the boundary change
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that removed the property from the city's jurisdiction occurred on May 20, 1902, before
the city exercised its assessment and levy power:
Feb 3, 1902
Salt Lake City Tax
Levy and Assessment

Statutory Lien Date

May 20, 1902
Private Property
Disconnected from SL City
into SL County

fe~: 19{/2'

Mar;1902

Ap:, 19,02 . .

May 190?

Jun 1902

~ul 1902

The Court found that no city taxes were due because, on the date of the city's
assessment and levy- July 28, 1902- the property was outside the city's jurisdiction.
This Court established that a property tax "does not become a lien on real estate until the
rate thereof is fixed [assessed], and the tax levied." Id. at 934. The Court explained that a
taxing entity cannot legally exercise its taxing power over property beyond its authority
at the time of assessment and levy. See id. Thus, "any levy upon property not within
such limits is without authority and void." Id. Based on this reasoning, this Court
concluded, "As no lien can exist for taxes illegally levied ... the lien ... is untenable."
Id.
In Utah Parks Co. v. Iron County, this Court held that taxes were "erroneously and
illegally levied" because the property had been conveyed to a tax exempt entity after the
statutory lien date (January 1st) but before the levy and assessment. 380 P.2d 924,926
(Utah 1963). As portrayed in the timeline below, Iron County's assessment occurred on
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•
April 15, 1958, and the property was conveyed to Cedar City on January 31, 1958, before

•

the county exercised its levy and assessment authority:

Jan 1, 1958
Iron County Tax
Assessment

Statutory Lien Date

Jan 1, 1958

Jan 15, 1958

Feb 1, 1958

Feb 15, 1958

Mar 1, 1958

Mar 15, 1958

Apr 1, 1958

This Court applied the reasoning from Gillmor- that a municipality cannot legally
exercise its taxing power unless that property is subject to its authority at the time the
assessment and levy are made. Id. at 925 ("We adhere, in the instant case, to the
reasoning of the Gillmor case and reach the conclusion that the 1958 ad valorem
tax ... was erroneously and illegally levied and collected by Iron County.").
In Huntington City v. Peterson, a case factually similar to the one at issue here,
this Court held that property conveyed out of the Emery County' s jurisdiction was not
subject to a property tax lien. 518 P.2d 1246, 1249 (Utah 1974). As the timeline below
shows, Emery County's levy occurred in August of 1959, and the property was conveyed
to Huntington City before that date, on April 7, 1959:
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Jan 1, 1959

Aug 1959

Statutory Lien Date

Emery County

•

Tax levy

Apr 7, 1959
Privat e Property Sold
to Hunt ington City

J~~ 1959

Fep'1959

-~ar 1959

A~r 1959

_May 1959

Ju'n 1959

Jul 1959

Aug 1959

Citing Gillmor, the Court reasoned that, although the conveyance occurred after the
statutory lien date (January 1st), Emery County lacked the power to assess and levy taxes
on the property because, when the county conducted its assessment and levy, the property
was outside its jurisdiction. See id.
Finally, in West Valley City Corp. v. Salt Lake City, this Court held, "[T]he date of
assessment and levy, not the statutory lien date of January 1st, is the relevant date for
determining whether property is within the reach of a taxing entity' s power for purpose of
assessing, levying, and collecting taxes on the property." 852 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Utah
1993). In that case, Salt Lake County's levy occurred on June 22, 1988, and the private
property was transferred from Salt Lake County into West Valley City's taxing
jurisdiction on March 31, 1998, as this timeline shows:
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Jan 1, 1988
SL County Tax Levy
Statutory Lien Date

, Mar 31 , 1988
Private Property
Annexed out of SL
County into WVC

Jan 1988

Feb 1988

Mar 1988

Apr 1988

May 1988

Jun 1988

Again, the Court held that the levy date, rather than the statutory lien date, was the
relevant date for determining whether a taxing entity had authority to tax property. Id.

3

The Jensens only response to this line of cases is to argue that the holdings are
limited to tax exempt entities, where the "levy must be zero." The Jensens' argument
isolates specific, sometimes irrelevant, portions of individual decisions, and it completely
ignores the holdings in Gillmor and West Valley City, neither of which involved the
transfer of property to a tax exempt entity. The Jensens make no argument for the Court
to overturn these cases, they are the longstanding law of the land, and they are controlling
of the issue before the Court.
All of these cases, and countless district court and taxing authority decisions
applying them, demonstrate that the date on which to determine whether a taxing entity
has the power to assess and levy a property interest is the date on which the entity would

3

The Jensens attempt to distinguish West Valley City on the basis that it dealt solely with
the allocation of tax revenue. Not so. As with Gillmor, the Court in West Valley City
focused on whether a taxing entity had the authority to assess and levy the property at the
time the levy and assessment were made.
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•
conduct is assessment and levy of the interest. Naturally, if the interest is outside the
entity's taxing jurisdiction when the entity would conduct its tax assessment and levy,
then the assessment and levy may not extend to that property interest.
The reasoning from Gillmor and its progeny applies here. As the timeline below
shows, the Jordans severed the mineral interest from the surface interest on February 3,
1995, and Uintah County's assessment did not occur until May of 1995, with the levy
taking place later that year: 4

Jan 1, 1995
Statutory Lien Date

Uintah County Assessment

Feb 3, 1995
Mineral Rights Severed

Jan- 1, 1995 Ja"!)5, 1995

Feb1 ; 1995 Feb15,1995Mar' 1, 1995 Mar15,1995

Apr1 , 1995 Apr15,1995

May1,1995

•

Because the mineral interest in the Property was severed prior to the County' s assessment
and levy, it was no longer attached to the surface estate and, as a result, not subject to
Uintah County's tax authority at the time the county exercised that authority. As a result,
Uintah County could not legally assess the mineral interest and levy a tax against it. Its
tax lien, though valid as to the surface estate, did not attach to the mineral interest.
Because the mineral interest was validly severed from the surface estate before the
property tax lien attached to the Property, Uintah County did not acquire the mineral
4

R. 241, ~5 and 247, ~ 5.
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interest and could not have conveyed it in the May 2000 tax sale-the sole source of the
Jensens' title.

4.

Even if Uintah County could have validly assessed the severed
mineral interest in 1995, the County announced that it was
seizing and selling only the property interest subject to its
authority on January 16, 1996.

The January 1, 1995 statutory lien date is irrelevant, not only because the time on
which to detennine whether Uintah County could tax the Property was when the County
exercised that authority in May, 1995, but also because the County selected January 16,
1996 as the tax lien date. In its Record of Delinquent Taxes-the only recorded notice of
the lien-Uintah County indicated that the lien attached to the Property as ofJanuary 16,

1996, well after the February 3, 1995 severance of the mineral rights. (R. 343.)
The J ensens claim that this recorded lien date is incorrect, but they provide no
supporting evidence. January 16, 1996 is the date that the County chose for its tax lien.
While the Jensens argue that there was no law requiring the County to publish notice of
the lien, there was no law preventing the County from recording evidence of its lien,
either. The real question is whether there was a law preventing the County from selecting

14/

January 16, 1996 as the date for its tax lien. There was no such law, and the County's
notice was recorded for subsequent purchasers to use to determine the scope of interests
that the County could seize and sell.
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B.

Uintah County's Failure To Give Notice of a Tax Sale of the Jordans'
Severed Mineral Interests Violated Due Process and Rendered The
Tax Deed Void. 5

Assuming that the County could have seized and sold the Jordans' mineral
interests through the 2000 tax deed to QRS, the tax deed is void as to the J ordans'
interests because the Jordans did not receive notice of the tax delinquency and
subsequent, May 2000 tax sale. The Jensens themselves recognize that such failure to
give notice gives rise to a "slam dunk challenge to the Tax Deed." They claim, however,
that Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-2-206 prevents the Jordans from challenging the tax sale
because the statutory time period has expired. The district court rejected this argument
and held that "the [tax] sale, if intended to convey the severed mineral interests, was
without due process of law, and resulted in an unconstitutional taking." (R. 1829.) The
district court was correct.

1.

The Statute of Limitation in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-206 Does
Not Bar a Due Process Challenge to a Tax Sale.

It is fundamental that citizens' property rights cannot be extinguished by
government action without notice and an opportunity to be heard. U.S. Const. Amend.
XIV; Utah Const. Art. I, § 7. The United States has repeatedly held that notice and an
opportunity to be heard are rights of fundamental fairness. "[T]here can be no doubt that
at a minimum [these clauses] require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by
adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing .... " Mullane v. Cent.

5

This assumes that the Jordans' mineral interest was actually seized and sold by Uintah
County, even though the County lacked authority to do so, as Axia and the J ordans have
previously demonstrated.
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Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (emphasis added). Notice "is a
minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will adversely affect the
liberty or property interests of any party." Mennonite Bd. ofMissions v. Adams, 462 U.S.
791, 800 (1983); Pangea Technologies, Inc. v. Internet Promotions, Inc., 2004 UT 40, 1
8, 94 P .3d 257 (describing notice as a fundamental feature of due process that must "be
given to the person whose rights are to be affected"); Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P .2d 1207,
1211-12 (Utah 19 83) (notice is "[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due
process"); Worral v. Ogden City Fire Dep 't, 616 P.2d 598, 601 (Utah 1980) (holding that
ii)

''every significant deprivation, whether pennanent or temporary, of an interest, which is
qualified as 'property' under the due process clause must be preceded by notice and
opportunity for hearing" and reasoning that the opportunity to be heard "has little reality
or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and one can choose for himself
whether to contest").
Notice must be given in a tax sale in order to satisfy due process. In Jones v.

Flowers, the United States Supreme Court held, "Before a State may take property and
sell it for unpaid taxes, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
the government to provide the owner 'notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to
the nature of the case."' 547 U.S. 220,223, (2006) (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313).
This Court has recognized that
"[T]he right of the government to sell lands for taxes, can
only be maintained on 'the absolute sovereignty of the state in
the exercise of its taxing power. To divest ownership,
without personal notice ... is the instance in which a
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constitutional government approaches most nearly to an
unrestrained tyranny.'"

Fivas v. Peterson, 300 P.2d 635, 639 (Utah 1956).
Here, the Jordans were not given any notice whatsoever of the tax sale. Uintah
County had the Jordans' mailing address, but failed to send the Jordans notice by mail or
otherwise. Cf Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 800 ("Notice by mail or other means as certain to
ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will
adversely affect the liberty or property interest of any party ... if its name and address
are reasonably ascertainable."). Such failure to provide notice renders the tax sale void,
regardless of the Jordans' ability to constantly check the public records to determine
whether a tax lien was recorded against their mineral interest. Contrary to the J ensens'
argument, "' [A] party's ability to take steps to safeguard its own interests does not relieve
the [the government] of its constitutional obligation."' Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220,
232 (2006) (quoting Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 799). The failure to give the Jordans notice
of the tax sale violated due process.
The J ensens do not contest the due process violation. Instead, they challenge the
Jordans' ability to vindicate their due process right to notice because the J ordans did not
assert their rights within the statute of limitations period set forth in Utah Code Ann.

§ 78B-2-206. If adopted, the Jensens' argument would nullify the due process right to
notice. Essentially, the Jensens argue that if the government deprives a citizen of
constitutionally required notice for long enough, it can '"turn[] a delict into a triumph."'
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State Tax Comm 'n v. Iverson, 782 P.2d 519, 526 (Utah 1989) (quoting State Tax Comm 'n
v. Spanish Fork, 100 P.2d 575,578 (Utah 1940)). The Jensens' argument is wrong.

In Schroeder v. City ofNew York, a case involving the lack of notice of a
condemnation proceeding, the United States Supreme Court held that New York was
constitutionally required to give notice of its proceeding to the owner of the property it
sought to condemn. In addition, the Court held that a three year statute of limitation did
not prevent the affected property owner from challenging the property seizure for failure
to satisfy due process. See 371 U.S. 208, 213-14 (1962). 6
In Utah, the statute of limitation for a tax sale has only been applied to technical
defects, not substantive due process violations, such as the failure to give notice. See
Frederiksen v. LaFluer, 632 P.2d 827, 831 (tax sale was conducted by an unqualified

officer); Layton v. Holt, 449 P.2d 986 (Utah 1961) (tax title failure to attach affidavit to
assessment roll); Peterson v. Callister, 313 P.2d 814, 815 (Utah 1957) (failure to attach
an auditor's affidavit to the assessment roll and the failure to acknowledge the
instruments). The Jensens have cited no case, from Utah or any other jurisdiction, where
a statute of limitation or repose has been applied to prevent a due process challenge for
lack of notice.

6

See also Morton v. Van Orsdol, 222 P.2d 520, 523 (Okla. 1950) (holding that the failure
to give proper notice rendered the tax sale void and that a statute of limitation did not
prevent a challenge to a tax deed for failure to give proper notice); Luster v Bank of
Chelsea, 730 P.2d 506, 510 (Okla. 1986) (declaring that the property owner was not
barred by a 12-month statute of limitation from raising a due process challenge to a tax
deed for failure to give notice).
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The Jensens argue that a statute of limitation can bar any right as long as the
limitation period is reasonable. To support this position, the Jensens rely on Terry v.

Anderson, 95 U.S. 628 (1877) and Sarnac Land &Timber Co. v. Roberts, 177 U.S. 318
(1900). Neither of these cases dealt with the failure to give notice. They addressed
whether the specific period of time listed in the statute of limitations was reasonable.
Moreover, contrary the J ensens' claim, these cases do not hold that any right can be
barred a statute of limitations. In crafting this argument, the J ensens ignore controlling
precedent.
The Jensens argue that constructive notice of the tax sale was sufficient to satisfy
due process. However, in Tulsa Prof'/ Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, the United States
Supreme Court held that, under Mullane and Mennonite, the application of a statute of
limitations triggered by state action, such as a tax sale under§ 78B-2-206, violates due
process unless the party adversely affected had actual notice of the state action. See 485
U.S. 478,491 (1988). Application of§ 78B-2-206 violates due process,just as
application of the two-month limitation violated due process in Tulsa; just as application
of the two-year redemption period violated due process in Mennonite; and just as
application of the three-year limitations period to challenge a condemnation violated due
process in Schroeder. Tulsa, 485 U.S. at 491; Mennonite, 462 U.S. at 800; Schroeder,
371 U.S. at 213-14 (1962).
Even assuming that constructive notice was sufficient, which it is not, the Jordans
did not have constructive notice that their mineral interest was included in the tax sale. It
is undisputed that: ( 1) the recorded lien date was January 16, 1996, almost a year after
28

the mineral interest had been severed, (2) the tax deed did not expressly indicate that it
included the mineral interest, (3) the J ordans were not given notice of delinquent taxes
for the 1995 or any year after that, (4) if contacted, Uintah County would have said that it
did not assess the mineral interest, and (5) neither the Jensens or their predecessor in
interest made any claim to the mineral interest until 2013, even though the Jordans had
issued multiple leases of record. Under these circumstances, there would have been no
way for the Jordans to have learned that their mineral interest had been included in the
tax sale.
For these reasons, application of Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-2-206 to the situation at
issue here violates due process.
2.

Application of the Statute of Limitations Would Violate
Fundamental Fairness.

In Frederiksen, a case dealing with a procedural defect to a tax sale, this Court
suggested that the statute of limitations would not apply when it was "repugnant to
fundamental fairness" or when "an application of the statute would exceed the limits of
statutory intent or constitutional permissibility." 632 P.2d 827,831 n.14 (Utah 1981).

..P

Lack of notice is repugnant to fundamental fairness. Pangea Technologies, Inc., 2004
UT 40, 1 8 (describing notice as a "fundamental feature of due process" that must "be
given to the person whose rights are to be affected").
In Kemmerer Coal Company v. Brigham Young University, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals construed Utah law to address whether a statute of limitations applied
to a tax sale involving defective notice. 723 F.2d 54 (10th Cir. 1983). Citing
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Frederiksen, the court stated that "[i]f a constitutional violation occurred, it was the
taking of the [debtor's] property without due process," id.at 56, which it characterized as
"repugnant to fundamental fairness," id at 57-58 (cited with approval in Shelledy v.

Lore, 836 P.2d 786 (Utah 1992)).
These cases illustrate that the failure to give notice in a tax sale is "repugnant to
fundamental fairness" and "exceeds the limits of statutory intent and constitutional
permissibility." Thus, the failure to give notice prevents the application of the statute of
limitations.
3.

The Failure to Give Notice Rendered the Tax Deed Void as to
the Severed Mineral Interest.

Notice is required to give a taxing authority jurisdiction over a property owner.
Without such notice, the taxing authority cannot acquire jurisdiction, and a tax sale
lacking in jurisdiction is void. The Jensens, however, argue that the failure to give notice
makes the tax deed voidable, not void. This argument conflicts with controlling case law.
Under Tulsa, Mennonite, and Schroeder, the due process violation is not only the failure
to give actual notice as a precondition to the tax sale, but also the failure to give actual
notice as a precondition to the running of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-206.
To support their argument that the tax deed is only voidable, the Jensens rely on

Hansen v. Morris, 283 P.2d 884 (Utah 1955), which was decided before and contains
statements (to the extent that they are not dicta) that are incompatible with Tulsa,

Mennonite, and Schroeder. Moreover, Hansen did not involve a deprivation of
constitutionally required notice. Rather, the tax sale was challenged "because statutory
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procedural requirements have not been followed." Id. at 885 (emphasis added). A
constitutional due process challenge was also leveled, but the particulars of it are
unexpressed in the opinion. Id. at 887 ("As to (4) the constitutionality of the statute,
without indulging in a lengthy discussion , , ,, we are constrained to hold that defendants'
assertion that such statute deprives them of property without due process of law, cannot
be sustained under the authorities applicable to limitations statutes generally."). It is,
therefore, impossible to apply Hansen to this case, especially considering the U.S.
Supreme Court's subsequent, binding decisions in Tulsa, Mennonite, and Schroeder.
The Jensens cite Lake Canal Reservoir Co. v. Beethe, 227 P.3d 882 (Colo. 2010),
but that case is inapplicable. Lake Canal holds that deficient notice renders a deed
voidable, not void, so the alleged notice defects did not prevent application of the statute
of limitations. Id. at 890. It is impossible to square this case with United States Supreme
Court holdings, but, regardless, Utah law differs from Colorado law in this respect.
This Court has consistently held that that the failure to give proper notice renders a
deed void. In Tintic Undine Mining Co., this Court held that the failure to give proper
notice-the notice misidentified the property-rendered a tax deed ''void." 74 P .2d
1184, 1189 (Utah 1938) ("Any advertisement for delinquency, and on the sale of the
property, in the name of a different owner, or of property of a different description than
assessed, has no foundation and is therefore void."). 7 Likewise, in Home Owners' Loan

7

The court clarified that the phrase "mistake in the name" (found in an earlier version of
Utah Code Ann.§ 59-2-303, which states "No mistake in the name or address of the
owner or supposed owner of property renders the assessment invalid") means a small
error in the name, such as a misspelling of the first name or a change in the middle name,
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Corporation v. Stevens, a county's failure to publish notice of the sale rendered a tax
deed ''void." 97 P.2d 744, 747 (Utah 1940) ("The failure of the county to publish the
notice of said sale prescribed by law rendered such sale void. . . . The sale, therefore, to
the respondents in this case was ineffective to convey the title of the county.").
Accordingly, Lake Canal is inapplicable.
Further, the alleged notice defect in Lake Canal differs significantly from lack of
notice to the Jordans. Lake Canal involved a challenge to a tax deed by neighboring
property owners who claimed the property by adverse possession. 227 P.3d at 884. The
neighbors claimed that "notice was ineffective because the published description did not
contain a lot number and because notice was not served on everyone who had an interest
or possession .... " Id at 889-90. The Court explained that the neighbors' unrecorded,
adverse possession-based interest did not entitle them to actual notice:
the notice requirement has long been understood to primarily
protect the interest of owners of record.... In this case, the
original owner of record is not involved in the appeal before
us. Instead, a number of persons who each claim to have an
interest in the [property] (and who dispute other parties'
interests) argue that they, in addition to the owner of record,
should have received notice. In particular, it is still unclear
from the record which parties in this case had a possessory
interest that would entitle them to notice ....

Id at 890. Here, the Jordans were (and still are) owners of record and thus were entitled
to actual notice of the tax sale. The failure to give notice of the tax sale is a jurisdictional
defect that renders the tax sale void. Had Lake Canal been decided under Utah law and
cont'd

not assessing the property in the name of another person altogether, as was done here.
Tintic, 74 P.2d at 1189.
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under the facts of the present case, the outcome would have been different. The court
would have held the statute of limitations inapplicable.
C.

The Wrongful Removal of Ore Statute Does Not Apply to Oil and Gas.

The J ensens complaint alleged that the production of oil and gas from the Property
violated Utah Code Ann.§ 40-1-12 (Damages for Wrongful Removal of Ores) and that,
as a result, the J ensens are entitled to treble damages, as provided for in the statute under
limited circumstances. The Jensens lack standing to assert a wrongful removal of ore
claim concerning a mineral interest they never owned. But even if the Court finds in
..;J

their favor on the ownership issues, § 40-1-12 is inapplicable. The district court
dismissed the Jensens' § 40-1-12 claim, finding that the wrongful removal of ore statute
did not apply to oil and gas production, which is instead governed by Utah Code Ann.

§ 40-6-1 et seq. The district court was correct.
1.

The Penalty For Unauthorized Removal of Oil and Gas is
Governed by Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-9.

Title 40 of the Utah Code is labeled "Mines and Mining." Chapter 1 of Title 40,
the section in which the wrongful removal of ore statute is located, is labeled "Mining
~

Claims" and contains statutes governing such claims, including sections regarding the
size and shape of lode claims, staking discovery monuments, and filing affidavits of
annual labor-none of which have anything whatsoever to do with oil and gas. The
portions of Title 40 that deal with oil and gas are found in Chapter 6 (Board and Division
of Oil, Gas, and Mining). In particular, Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-9 contains the remedies
and penalties pertaining to oil and gas production, allowing an aggrieved party to petition
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the Utah Board of Oil, Gas and Mining to impose penalties for failure to properly pay the
proceeds from oil and gas production. The wrongful removal of ore statute does not
apply to production of oil and gas.

2.

The Term "Ore" Does Not Mean Oil and Gas.

The Jensens urge this Court to expand the commonly accepted definition of ore to
include oil and gas. The Jensens argue that "ore" is "[t]he naturally occurring material
from which a mineral or minerals of economic value can be extracted profitably .... "
(Jensens' Brf. at 47, 49 (citing A Dictionary of Mining, Mineral, & Related Terms, an
industry specific dictionary) (emphasis added)). Using this definition, the Jensens reason
that "oil and gas are naturally occurring materials from which a range of valuable
hydrocarbon products can be produced .... " (Id. at 47.) This requires the Court to believe
that hydrocarbon products, such as tires and plastics, are minerals. The Jensens cite
nothing to link "minerals" to petroleum products, and their argument is incompatible with
the plain meaning of the term "minerals." Using the same source cited by the Jensens,
"mineral" is defined as "(a) A naturally occurring inorganic element or compound having
an orderly internal structure and characteristic chemical composition crystal form, and
physical properties." Dictionary of Mining, Mineral, and Related Terms 347 (2d. ed.
1997. The manufactured products of oil and gas are not "naturally occurring" elements
or compounds.
Moreover, given that the wrongful removal of ore statute includes-and the
Jensens hope to take advantage of (R. 39, 17.)-the extraordinary penalty of treble
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damages, the statute should be narrowly constmed. See Sutherland Statutory
Construction§ 59:2 (7th ed.); Saine v. A.I.A., Inc., 582 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Colo. 1984).
For these reasons, the wrongful removal of ore statute does not and should not
apply to production of oil and gas from the Property.
Vlll. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, this Court should affirm the district court's decisions.
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ADDENDUM

.'':;'\
~

EXHIBIT "A"

AMENDMENT XIV. CITIZENSHIP; PRIVILEGES AND ... , USCA CONST Amend ....

United States Code Annotated
Constitution of the United States
A.nnulaled
Amcmlmenl XIV. Citizenship; Privileges aml Immunities; Due Process; Equal Protection;
Apportionment of Representation; Disqualification of Officers; Public Debt; Enforcement
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. XIV-Full Text

AMENDMENT XIV. CITIZENSHIP; PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES; DUE
PROCESS; EQUAL PROTECTION; APPOINTMENT OF REPRESENTATION;
DISQUALIFICATION OF OFFICERS; PUBLlC DEBT; ENFORCEMENT
Currentness
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of
electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers
of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one
years of age, and citizens of the United States. or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the
basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole
number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any
office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of
Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of
any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or
given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. Rut Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of
pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States,
or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims sha11 be held i11egal and void.

Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
<Section 1 of this amendment is further displayed in separate documents according to subject matter,>
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV, § I-Citizens>
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV,§ I-Privileges>

AMENDMENT XIV. CITIZENSHIP; PRIVILEGES AND ... , USCA CONST Amend ....

<see USCA Const Amend. XIV,§ 1-Due Proc>
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV,§ I-Equal Protect>
<sections 2 to 5 of this amendment are displayed as separate documents,>
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV,§ 2,>
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV,§ 3,>
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV,§ 4,>
<see USCA Const Amend. XIV,§ 5,>

U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. XIV-Full Text, USCA CONST Amend. XIV-Full Text
Current through P.L. 114-114 (excluding 114-92, 114-94, 114-95 and 114-113) approved 12-28-2015
End of Document
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EXHIBIT "B"

Sec. 6. [State Tax Commission], UT CONST Art.13, § 6

West's Utah Code Annotated
Constitution of Utah
Article XTTI. Revenue and Taxation

U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art.13, § 6
Sec. 6. [State Tax Commission]
Currentness

(1) There shall be a State Tax Commission consisting of four members, not more than two of whom may belong to the same
political party.

(2) With the consent of the Senate, the Governor shall appoint the members of the State Tax Commission for such terms as

may be provided by statute.

(3) The State Tax Commission shall:

(a) administer and supervise the State's tax laws;

(b) assess mines and public utilities and have such other powers of original assessment as the Legislature may provide by
statute;

(c) adjust and equalize the valuation and assessment of property among the counties;

(d) as the Legislature provides by statute, review proposed bond issues, revise local tax levies, and equalize the assessment
and valuation of property within the counties; and

(e) have other powers as may be provided by statute.

(4) Notwithstanding the powers granted to the State Tax Commission in this Constitution, the Legislature may by statute
authorize any court established under Article VIII to adjudicate, review, reconsider, or redetermine any matter decided by the
State Tax Commission relating to revenue and taxation.

Credits
Laws 2002, S.J.R. I 0, § 6, adopted at election Nov. 5, 2002, eff. Jan. I, 2003.

U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 13, § 6, UT CONST Art. 13, § 6
Current through 2015 First Special Session
End of Document
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EXHIBIT "C"

Sec. 2. [Property tax], UT CONST Art. 13, § 2

West's Utah Code .Annotated
Constitution of Utah
Article XIII. ReYenuc and Taxation

U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 13, § 2
Sec. 2. [Property tax]

Currentness

(1) So that each person and corporation pays a tax in proportion to the fair market value of his, her, or its tangible property, aII
tangible property in the State that is not exempt under the laws of the United States or under this Constitution shall be:

(a) assessed at a uniform and equal rate in proportion to its fair market value, to be ascertained as provided by law; and

(b) taxed at a uniform and equal rate.

(2) Each corporation and person in the State or doing business in the State is subject to taxation on the tangible property owned
or used by the corporation or person within the boundaries of the State or local authority levying the tax.

(3) The Legislature may provide by statute that land used for agricultural purposes be assessed based on its value for agricultural
use.

(4) The Legislature may by statute determine the manner and extent of taxing livestock.

(5) The Legislature may by statute determine the manner and extent of taxing or exempting intangible property, except that any
property tax on intangible property may not exceed .005 of its fair market value. If any intangible property is taxed under the
property tax, the income from that property may not also be taxed.

(6) Tangible personal property required by law to be registered with the State before it is used on a public highway or waterway,
on public land, or in the air may be exempted from property tax by statute. If the Legislature exempts tangible personal property
from property tax under this Subsection (6), it shall provide for the payment of uniform statewide fees or uniform statewide
rates of assessment or taxation on that property in lieu of the property tax. The fair market value of any property exempted
under this Subsection (6) shall be considered part of the State tax base for determining the debt limitation under Article XIV.

Credits
Laws 2002, S.J.R. l 0, § 2, adopted at election Nov. 5, 2002, eff. Jan. I. 2003.

U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 13, § 2, UT CONST Art. 13, § 2
Current through 2015 First Special Session
End of Document
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EXHIBIT "D"

Sec. 7. [Due process of law], UT CONST Art.1, § 7

West's Utah Code Annotated
Constitution of Utah
Article I. Declaration of Rights
U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 1, § 7

Sec. 7. [Due process oflaw]
Currentness
No person shall be deprived oflife, liberty or property, without due process oflaw.

U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 1, § 7, UT CONST Art. 1, § 7
Current through 2015 First Special Session
End of Document
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EXHIBIT "E"

§ 59-2-102. Definitions, UT ST § 59-2-102

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 59. ReYenue and Taxation
Chapter 2. Property Tax Act (Refs & Annos)
Pait 1. General Provisions
U.C.A 1953 § 59-2-102
§ 59-2-102. Definitions

Currentness
As used in this chapter and title:

(1) "Aerial applicator" means aircraft or rotorcraft used exclusively for the purpose of engaging in dispensing activities directly
affecting agriculture or horticulture with an airworthiness certificate from the Federal Aviation Administration certifying the
aircraft or rotorcraft's use for agricultural and pest control purposes.

(2) "Air charter service" means an air carrier operation which requires the customer to hire an entire aircraft rather than book
passage in whatever capacity is available on a scheduled trip.

(3) "Air contract service" means an air carrier operation available only to customers who engage the services of the carrier
through a contractual agreement and excess capacity on any trip and is not available to the public at large.

(4) "Aircraft" is as defined in Section 72-10-102.

(5)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (5)(b), "airline" means an air carrier that:

(i) operates:

(A) on an interstate route; and

(B) on a scheduled basis; and

(ii) offers to fly one or more passengers or cargo on the basis of available capacity on a regularly scheduled route.

(b) "Airline" does not include an:

(i) air charter service; or

-

§ 59-2-102. Definitions, UT ST§ 59-2-102

(ii) air contract service.

(6) "Assessment roll" means a permanent record of the assessment of property as assessed by the county assessor and the
commission and may be maintained manually or as a computerized file as a consolidated record or as multiple records by type,
classification, or categories.

(7)(a) ..Certified revenue Jevy" means a property tax levy that provides an amount of ad valorem property tax revenue equal

to the sum of:

(i) the an1ount of ad valorem property tax revenue to be generated statewide in the previous year from imposing a school
minimum basic tax rate, as specified in Section 53A-l 7a-l 35, or multicounty assessing and collecting levy, as specified
in Section 59-2-1602; and

(ii) the product of:

(A) new growth, as defined in:

(I) Section 59-2-924; and

(II) rules of the commission; and

(B) the school minimum basic tax rate or multicounty assessing and collecting levy certified by the commission for
the previous year.

(b) For purposes of this Subsection (7), "ad valorem property tax revenue" does not include property tax revenue received
by a taxing entity from personal property that is:

(i) assessed by a county assessor in accordance with Part 3, County Assessment; and

(ii) semiconductor manufacturing equipment.

(c) For purposes of calculating the certified revenue levy described in this Subsection (7), the commission shall use:

(i) the taxable value of real property assessed by a county assessor contained on the assessment roll;

(ii) the taxable value of real and personal property assessed by the commission; and
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§ 59-2-102. Definitions, UT ST § 59-2-102

(iii) the taxable year end value of personal property assessed by a county assessor contained on the prior year's assessment
roll.

(8) "County-a-;sessed commercial vehicle" means:

(a) any commercial vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer which is not apportiun~u urn.ler Se1.:liun 41-1a-301 and is not operated
interstate to transport the vehicle owner's goods or property in furtherance of the owner's commercial enterprise;

(b) any passenger vehicle owned by a business anu used by its employees for trnnsportation as a company car or vanpool
vehicle; and

(c) vehicles that are:

(i) especially constructed for towing or wrecking, and that are not otherwise used to transport goods, merchandise, or
people for compensation;

(ii) used or licensed as taxicabs or limousines;

(iii) used as rental passenger cars, travel trailers, or motor homes;

(iv) used or licensed in this state for use as ambulances or hearses;

(v) especially designed and used for garbage and rubbish collection; or

(vi) used exclusively to transport students or their instructors to or from any private, public, or religious school or school
activities.

(9)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (9)(b), for purposes of Section 59-2-801, "designated tax area" means a tax area created
by the overlapping boundaries of only the following taxing entities:

(i) a county; and

(ii) a school district.

(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (9)(a), "designated tax area" includes a tax area created by the overlapping boundaries of:

(i) the taxing entities described in Subsection (9)(a); and

3

§ 59-2-102. Definitions, UT ST § 59-2-102

(ii)(A) a city or town if the boundaries of the school district under Subsection (9)(a) and the boundaries of the city or
town are identical; or

(B) a special service district if the boundaries of the school district under Subsection (9)(a) are located entirely within
the special service district.

{l 0) ..Eligible judgment" means a final and unappealable judgment or order under Section 59-2- 1330:

(a) that became a final and unappealable judgment or order nu mur~ than 14 munlhs prior Lo Lhe day on which the notice
required by Section 59-2-919. l is required to be mailed; and

(b) for which a taxing entity's share of the final and unappealable judgment or order is greater than or equal to the lesser of:

(i) $5,000; or

(ii) 2.5% of the total ad valorem property taxes collected by the taxing entity in the previous fiscal year.

(11 )(a) "Escaped property" means any property, whether personal, land, or any improvements to the property, subject to taxation
and is:

(i) inadvertently omitted from the tax rolls, assigned to the incorrect parcel, or assessed to the wrong taxpayer by the
assessing authority;

(ii) undervalued or omitted from the tax rolls because of the failure of the taxpayer to comply with the reporting
requirements of this chapter; or

(iii) undervalued because of errors made by the assessing authority based upon incomplete or erroneous information
furnished by the taxpayer.

(b) Property that is undervalued because of the use of a different valuation methodology or because of a different application

of the same valuation methodology is not "escaped property."

( 12) ..Fair market value" means the amount at which property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller,
neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts. For purposes of
taxation, "fair market value" shall be determined using the current zoning laws applicable to the property in question, except in
cases where there is a reasonable probability of a change in the zoning laws affecting that property in the tax year in question
and the change would have an appreciable influence upon the value.

4

§ 59-2-102. Definitions, UT ST§ 59-2-102

(13) "Fann machinery and equipment," for purposes of the exemption provided under Section 59-2-1101, means tractors,
milking equipment and storage and cooling facilities, feed handling equipment, irrigation equipment, harvesters, choppers,
grain drills and planters, tillage tools, scales, combines, spreaders, sprayers, haying equipment, including balers and cubers,
and any other machinery or equipment used primarily for agricultural purposes; but does not include vehicles requin::tl tu be
registered with the Motor Vehicle Division or vehicles or other equipment used for business purposes other than farming.

(14) "Geothermal fluid" means water in any form at temperatures greater than 120 degrees centigrade naturally present in a
geothermal system.

(15) "Geothermal resource" means:

(a) the natural heat of the earth at temperatures greater than 120 degrees centigrade; and

(b) the energy, in whatever form, including pressure, present in, resulting from, created by, or which may be extracted from
that natural heat, directly or through a material medium.

(16)(a) "Goodwill" means:

(i) acquired goodwill that is reported as goodwill on the books and records:

(A) of a taxpayer; and

(B) that are maintained for financial reporting purposes; or

(ii) the ability of a business to:

(A) generate income:

{I) that exceeds a normal rate of return on assets; and

(II) resulting from a factor described in Subsection (16)(b); or

(B) obtain an economic or competitive advantage resulting from a factor described in Subsection {l6)(b).

(b) The following factors apply to Subsection (16)(a)(ii):

(i) superior management skills;

5
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(ii) reputation;

(iii) customer relationships;

(iv) patronage; or

(v) a factor similar to Subsections ( J6)(b){i) through (iv).

(c) "Goodwil1" does not include:

(i) the intangible property described in Subsection (20)(a) or (b);

(ii) locational attributes ofreal property, including:

(A) zoning;

(B) location;

(C) view;

(D) a geographic feature;

(E) an easement;

(F) a covenant;

(G) proximity to raw materials;

(H) the condition of surrounding property; or

(I) proximity to markets;

(iii) value attributable to the identification of an improvement to real property, including:

(A) reputation of the designer, builder, or architect of the improvement;
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§ 59-2-102. Definitions, UT ST§ 59-2-102

(B) a name given to, or associated with, the improvement; or

(C) the historic significance of an improvement; or

(iv) the enhancement or assemblage value specifically attributable to the interrelation of the existing tangible property in
place working together as a unit.

(17) "Governing body" means:

(a) for a county, city, or town, the legislative body of the county, city, or town;

(b) for a local district under Title 17B, Limited Purpose Local Government Entities--Local Districts, the local district's board
of trustees;

(c) for a school district, the local board of education; or

(d) for a special service district under Title 17D, Chapter 1, Special Service District Act:

(i) the legislative body of the county or municipality that created the special service district, to the extent that the county
or municipal legislative body has not delegated authority to an administrative control board established under Section
170-1-301; or

(ii) the administrative control board, to the extent that the county or municipal legislative body has delegated authority to
an administrative control board established under Section 17D-1-301.

(18)(a) For purposes of Section 59-2-103:

(i) "household" means the association of persons who live in the same dwelling, sharing its furnishings, facilities,
accommodations, and expenses; and

(ii) "household" includes married individuals, who are not legally separated, that have established domiciles at separate
locations within the state.

(b) In accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, the commission may make rules defining
the term "domicile."

(19)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (19)(c), "improvement" means a building, structure, fixture, fence, or other item that
is permanently attached to land, regardless of whether the title has been acquired to the land, if:

§ 59-2-102. Definitions, UT ST § 59-2-102

(i)(A) attachment to land is essential to the operation or use of the item; and

(B) the manner of attachment to Jand suggests that the item will remain attached to the land in the same place over the
useful life of the item; or

(ii) removal of the item would:

(A) cause substantial damage to the item; or

(B) require substantial alteration or repair of a structure to which the item is attached.

(b) "Improvement" includes:

(i) an accessory to an item described in Subsection (19)(a) if the accessory is:

(A) essential tu the operation of the item described in Subsection (19)(a); and

(B) installed solely to serve the operation of the item described in Subsection (19)(a); and

(ii) an item described in Subsection (I 9)(a) that:

(A) is temporarily detached from the land for repairs; and

(B) remains located on the land.

(c) Notwithstanding Subsections (19)(a) and (b), "improvement" does not include:

(i) an item considered to be personal property pursuant to rules made in accordance with Section 59-2-I 07;

(ii) a moveable item that is attached to land:

(A) for stability only; or

(B) for an obvious temporary purpose;
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(iii)(A) manufacturing equipment and machinery; or

(B) essential accessories to manufacturing equipment and machinery;

(iv) an item attached to the land in a manner that facilitates removal without substantial damage to:

(A) the land; or

(B) the item; or

(v) a transportable factory-built housing unit as defined in Section 59-2-1502 if that transportable factory-built housing
unit is considered to be personal property under Section 59-2-1503.

(20) "Intangible property" means:

(a) property that is capable of private ownership separate from tangible property, including:

(i) money;

(ii) credits;

(iii) bonds;

(iv) stocks;

(v) representative property;

(vi) franchises;

(vii) licenses;

(viii) trade names;

(ix) copyrights; and

(x) patents;

9
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(b) a low-income housing tax credit;

(c) goodwill; or

(d) a renewable energy tax credit or incentive, including:

(i) a federal renewable energy production tax credit under Section 45, Internal Revenue Code;

(ii) a federal energy credit for qualified renewable electricity production facilities under Section 48, Internal Revenue Code;

(iii) a federal grant for a renewable energy property under American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L.
No. I l 1-5, Section 1603; and

(iv) a tax credit under Subsection 59-7-614(5).

(21) "Livestock" means:

(a) a domestic animal;

(b) a fish;

(c) a fur-bearing animal;

(d) a honeybee; or

(e) poultry.

(22) "Low-income housing tax credit" means:

(a) a federal low-income housing tax credit under Section 42, Internal Revenue Code; or

(b) a low-income housing tax credit under:

(i) Section 59-7-607; or
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(ii) Section 59-10-10 l 0.

(23) "Metalliferous minerals" includes gold, silver, copper, lead, zinc, and uranium.

(24) "Mine" means a natural deposit of either metalliferous or nonmetalliferous valuable mineral.

(25) "Mining" means the process of producing, extracting, leaching, evaporating, or otherwise removing a mineral from a mine.

(26)(a) "Mobile flight equipment" means tangible personal property that is:

(i) owned or operated by an:

(A) air charter service;

(B) air contract service; or

(C) airline; and

(ii)(A) capable of flight;

(B) attached to an aircraft that is capable of flight; or

(C) contained in an aircraft that is capable of flight if the tangible personal property is intended to be used:

(I) during multiple flights;

(II) during a takeoff, flight, or landing; and

(III) as a service provided by an air charter service, air contract service, or airline.

(b)(i) "Mobile flight equipment" does not include a spare part other than a spare engine that is rotated:

(A) at regular intervals; and

(B) with an engine that is attached to the aircraft.
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(ii) In accordance with Title 630, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, the commission may make rules
defining the term "regular intervals."

(27) "Nonmetalliferous minerals" includes, but is not limited to, oil, gas, coal, salts, sand, rock, gravel, and all carboniferous
materials.

(28) ..Part-year residential property" means property that is not residential property on January I of a calendar year but becomes
residential property after January I of the calendar year.

(29) ..Personal property" includes:

(a) every class of property as defined in Subsection (30) that is the subject of ownership and not included within the meaning
of the terms "real estate" and "improvements";

(b) gas and water mains and pipes laid in roads, streets, or alleys;

(c) bridges and ferries;

(d) livestock; and

(e) outdoor advertising structures as defined in Section 72-7-502.

(30)(a) "Property" means property that is subject to assessment and taxation according to its value.

(b) "Property" does not include intangible property as defined in this section.

(31) "Public utility," for pwposes of this chapter, means the operating property of a railroad, gas corporation, oil or gas
transportation or pipeline company, coal slurry pipeline company, electrical corporation, telephone corporation, sewerage
corporation, or heat corporation where the company performs the service for, or delivers the commodity to, the public generally
or companies serving the public generally, or in the case of a gas corporation or an electrical corporation, where the gas or
electricity is sold or furnished to any member or consumers within the state for domestic, commercial, or industrial use. Public
utility also means the operating property of any entity or person defined under Section 54-2-1 except water corporations.

(32)(a) Subject to Subsection (32)(b), "qualifying exempt primary residential rental personal property" means household
furnishings, furniture, and equipment that:

(i) are used exclusively within a dwelling unit that is the primary residence of a tenant;
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(ii) are owned by the owner of the dwelling unit that is the primary residence of a tenant; and

(iii) after applying the residential exemption described in Scl:liu11 59-2-103, au:: t:xi::mpl frum laxaliun um]er lhis chapter
in accordance with Subscclion 59-2-1115(2).

(b) In accordance with Title 630, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, the commission may by rule define the
term "dwelling unit" for pmposes of this Subsection (32) and Subsection (35).

(33) "Real estate" or "real property" includes:

(a) the possession of, claim to, ownership of, or right to the possession of land;

(b) all mines, minerals, and quarries in and under the land, all timber belonging to individuals or corporations growing or
being on the lands of this state or the United States, and all rights and privileges appertaining to these; and

(c) improvements.

(34) "Relationship with an owner of the property's land surface rights" means a relationship described in Subsection 267(b),
Internal Revenue Code:

(a) except that notwithstanding Subsection 267(b), Internal Revenue Code, the term 25% shall be substituted for the term
50% in Subsection 267(b), Internal Revenue Code; and

(b) using the ownership rules of Subsection 267(c), Internal Revenue Code, for determining the ownership of stock.

(35)(a) Subject to Subsection (35)(b), "residential property," for the purposes of the reductions and adjustments under this
chapter, means any property used for residential purposes as a primary residence.

(b) Subject to Subsection (35)(c), "residential property":

(i) except as provided in Subsection (3S)(b)(ii), includes household furnishings, furniture, and equipment if the household
furnishings, furniture, and equipment arc:

(A) used exclusively within a dwelling unit that is the primary residence of a tenant; and

(B) owned by the owner of the dwelling unit that is the primary residence of a tenant; and

(ii) does not include property used for transient residential use.
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(c) In accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulernaking Act, the commission may by rule define the
term "dwelling unit" for purposes of Subsection (32) and this Subsection (35).

(36) "Split estate mineral rights owner" means a person who:

(a) has a Jega1 right to extract a mineral trom property;

(b) does not hold more than a :2.5% interest m:

(i) the land surface rights of the property where the wellhead is located; or

(ii) an entity with an ownership interest in the land surface rights of the property where the wellhead is located;

(c) is not an entity in which the owner of the land surface rights of the property where the wellhead is located holds more
than a 25% interest; and

(d) does not have a relationship with an owner of the land surface rights of the property where the wellhead is located.

(37)(a) "State-assessed commercial vehicle" means:

(i) any commercial vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer which operates interstate or intrastate to transport passengers, freight,
merchandise, or other property for hire; or

(ii) any commercial vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer which operates interstate and transports the vehicle owner's goods or
property in furtherance of the owner's commercial enterprise.

(b) "State-assessed commercial vehicle" does not include vehicles used for hire which are specified in Subsection (8)(c) as
county-assessed commercial vehicles.

(38) "Taxable value" means fair market value less any applicable reduction allowed for residential property under Section
59-2-103.

(39) "Tax area" means a geographic area created by the overlapping boundaries of one or more taxing entities.

(40) "Taxing entity" means any county, city, town, school district, special taxing district, local district under Title 17B, Limited
Purpose Local Government Entities--Local Districts, or other political subdivision of the state with the authority to levy a tax
on property.
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(41) "Tax roll,, means a pennanent record of the taxes charged on property, as extended on the assessment roll and may be
maintained on the same record or records as the assessment roll or may be maintained on a separate record properly indexed
to the assessment roll. It includes tax books, tax lists. and other similar materials.

Credits
Laws 1987, c. 4, § 49; Laws 1987, c. 93, § 1; Laws 1988, c. 3, § 90; Laws 1989, c. 204, § l; Laws 1990, c. 41, § 1; Laws 1990,
c. 212. § 1; Laws 1991, c. 263, § 2; Laws l 992, c. 1, § 198; Laws 1992, c. 221, § 1; Laws 1992, c. 237, § I; Laws l 995, c.
271, ~ 8, efT. May 1, 1995; J.aws 1996, c. 170, § 55, cff. July 1, 1996; Laws 1997. c. 360, § 9, eff. Jan. l, 1997; Laws 1998,
c. 264, § 2, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 1998, c. 290, § I, eff. Jan. I, 1998; Laws 1999, c. 134, § I, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2000,
c. 61, § I. ef( May l,. 2000; Laws 2002, c. 196, § l, eff. Jan. I, 2003; Laws 2002, c. 2·10, § l, eff. Jan. I, 2003; Laws 2003, <.:.
I 13, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2004, c. 162, § 1, eff. May 3, 2004; Laws 2004, c. 243, § 1, eff. May 3, 2004; Laws 2004.
c. 281, § l, eff. Jan. 1, 2005; Laws 2004, c. 303, § l, eff May 3, 2004; Laws 2006, c. 223, § 5, cff. May l, 2006; Laws 2006,
c. 249, § 1, eff. May l, 2006; Laws 2007, c. 107, § 2, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2007, c. 234, § I, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws
2007, c. 329, § 417, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2008, c. 61, § 8, eff Jan. 1, 2009; Laws 2008, c. 231, § 8, eff. July 1, 2008; Laws
2008, c. 283, § l, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 30 l, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2009; Laws 2008, c. 360, § 153, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws
2008, c. 382, § 963, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 20 I 0, c. 14, § I, eff. May 11, 2010; Laws 20 l 2, c. 240, § 1, eff. May 8, 2012;
Laws 2013, c. 19, § 1, cff. Jan. I, 2014; Laws 2013, c. 322, § 1, eff. May 14, 2013; Laws 2014, c. 65, § 2, eff. Jan. I, 2015;
Laws 2014, c. 411, § 17, eff. May 13, 2014; Laws 2015, c. 133, § l, eff. May 12, 2015; Laws 2015, c. 198, § 1, eff. May 12,
2015; Laws 2015, c. 287, § 6, eff. July I, 2015.
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EXHIBIT "F"

§ 59-2-201. Assessment by commission-Determination of value ... , UT ST § 59-2-201

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 59. Revenue and Taxation
Chapter 2. Property Tax Act (Refs & Annas)
Pait 2. Assessment of Property

U.C.A. 1953 § 59-2-201
§ 59-2-201. Assessment by commission--Determination of value of mining

property--Notification of assessment--Local assessment of property
assessed by the unitary method-Commission may consult with county
Currentness

(l)(a) By May 1 of each year the following property, unless otherwise exempt under the Utah Constitution or under Part 11,
Exemptions, Deferrals, and Abatements, shall be assessed by the commission at 100% of fair market value, as valued on January
1, in accordance with this chapter:

(i) except as provided in Subsection (2), all property which operates as a unit across county lines, if the values must be
apportioned among more than one county or state;

(ii) all property of public utilities;

(iii) all operating property of an airline, air charter service, and air contract service;

(iv) all geothermal fluids and geothermal resources;

(v) all mines and mining claims except in cases, as determined by the commission, where the mining claims are used for
other than mining purposes, in which case the value of mining claims used for other than mining purposes shall be assessed
by the assessor of the county in which the mining claims are located; and

(vi) all machinery used in mining, all property or surface improvements upon or appurtenant to mines or mining claims.
For the purposes of assessment and taxation, all processing plants, mills, reduction works, and smelters which are primarily
used by the owner of a mine or mining claim for processing, reducing, or smelting minerals taken from a mine or mining
claim shall be considered appurtenant to that mine or mining claim, regardless of actual location.

(b)(i) For purposes of Subsection ( 1)(a)(iii), operating property of an air charter service does not include an aircraft that is:

(A) used by the air charter service for air charter; and

(B) owned by a person other than the air charter service.

r:-.
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(ii) For purposes of this Subsection (l)(b):

(A) "person" means a natural person, individual, corporation, organization, or other legal entity; and

(B) a person does not qualify as a person other than the air charter service as described in Subsection (1 )(b )(i)(B) if
the person is:

(I) a principal, owner, or member of the air charter service; or

{II) a legal entity that has a principal, owner, or member of the air charter service as a principal, owner, or member
of the legal entity.

(2) The commission shall assess and collect property tax on state-assessed commercial vehicles at the time of original registration
or annual renewal.

(a) The commission shall assess and collect property tax annually on state-assessed commercial vehicles which are registered
pursuant to Section 41-1 a-222 or 41-1 a-228.

(b) State-assessed commercial vehicles brought into the state which are required to be registered in Utah shall, as a condition
of registration, be subject to ad valorem tax unless all property taxes or fees imposed by the state of origin have been paid
for the current calendar year.

(c) Real property, improvements, equipment, fixtures, or other personal property in this state owned by the company shall
be assessed separately by the local county assessor.

(d) The commission shall adjust the value of state-assessed commercial vehicles as necessary to comply with 49 U.S.C.
Sec. 14502, and the commission shall direct the county assessor to apply the same adjustment to any personal property, real
property, or improvements owned by the company and used directly and exclusively in their commercial vehicle activities.

(3) The method for determining the fair market value of productive mining property is the capitalized net revenue method
or any other valuation method the commission believes, or the taxpayer demonstrates to the commission's satisfaction, to be
reasonably determinative of the fair market value of the mining property. The rate of capitalization applicable to mines shall
be determined by the commission, consistent with a fair rate ofreturn expected by an investor in light of that industry's current
market, financial, and economic conditions. In no event may the fair market value of the mining property be less than the fair
market value of the land, improvements, and tangible personal property upon or appurtenant to the mining property.

(4) Immediately following the assessment, the owner or operator of the assessed property shall be notified of the assessment by
certified mail. The assessor of the county in which the property is located shall also be immediately notified of the assessment
by certified mail.
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(5) The commission may consult with a county in valuing property in accordance with this part.

(6) Property assessed by the unitary method, which is not necessary to the conduct and does not contribute to the income of the
business as determined by the commission, shall be assessed separately by the local county assessor.

Credits
Laws 1987, c. 4, § 53; Laws 1989, c. 204, § 2; Laws 1990, c. 41, § 2; Laws 1991, c. 263, § 4; Laws 1995, c. 138, § 1, eff.
May 1, 1995; Laws 1997, c. 360, § 10, eff. Jan. I, 1997; Laws 2007, c.119, § l, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2007, c. 306, §
55, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2009, c. 226, § 1, eff. May 12, 2009; Laws 2009, c. 235, § 1, eff. May 12, 2009; Laws 2015,
c. 139, § I, eff. Jan. I, 2016.
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EXHIBIT "G"

§ 40-1-12. Damages for wrongful removal of ores, UT ST§ 40-1-12

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 40. Mines and Mining
Chapter 1. Mining Claims (Refs & Annas)
U.C.A 1953 § 40-1-12
§ 40-1-12. Damages for wrongful removal of ores

Currentness
When damages are claimed for the extraction or selling of ore from any mine or mining claim and the defendant, or those under
whom he claims, holds, under color of title adverse to the claims of the plaintiff, in good faith, then the reasonable value of all
labor bestowed or expenses incurred in necessary developing, mining, transporting, concentrating, selling or preparing said ore,
or its mineral content, for market, must be allowed as an offset against such damages; provided, however, that any person who,
wrongfully·entering upon any mine or mining claim and carrying away ores therefrom, or wrongfully extracting and selling
ores from any mine, having know ledge of the existence of adverse claimants in any mine or mining claim, and without notice
to them, knowingly and willfully trespasses in or upon such mine or mining claim and extracts or sells ore therefrom shall be
liable to the owners of such ore for three times the value thereof without any deductions either for labor bestowed or expenses
incurred in removing, transporting, selling or preparing said ore, or its mineral content for market.

Credits
Laws 1937, c. 63, § 1.
Codifications R.S. 1898, § 1536; C.L. 1907, § 1536; C.L. 1917, § 3938; R.S. 1933, § 55-1-12; C. 1943, § 55-1-12.
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EXHIBIT "H"

§ 40-6-9. Proceeds from sale of production--Payment of... , UT ST § 40-6-9

\•Vest's Utah Code Annotated
Title 40. Mines and Mining

Chapter 6. Board and Dhision of Oil, Gas, and Mining (Refs & Annos)

U.C.A. 1953 § 40-6-9
§ 40-6-9. Proceeds from sale of production--Payment of proceeds--Requirements-

Proceeding on petition to determine cause ofnonpayment--Remedies--Penalties
Currentness
(l)(a) The oil and gas proceeds derived from the sale of production from any well producing oil or gas in the state shall be paid
to any person legally entitled to the payment of the proceeds not later than 180 days after the first day of the month following
the date of the first sale and thereafter not later than 30 days after the end of the calendar month within which payment is
received by the payor for production, unless other periods or arrangements are provided for in a valid contract with the person
entitled to the proceeds.

(b) The payment shall be made directly to the person entitled to the payment by the payor.

(c) The payment is considered to have been made upon deposit in the United States mail.

(2) Payments shall be remitted to any person entitled to oil and gas proceeds annually for the aggregate of up to 12 months
accumulation of proceeds, if the total amount owed is $100 or less.

(3)(a) Any delay in determining whether a person is legally entitled to an interest in the oil and gas proceeds does not affect
payments to other persons entitled to payment.

(b)(i) If accrued payments cannot be made within the time limits specified in Subsection (1) or (2), the payor shall deposit
all oil and gas proceeds credited to the eventual oil and gas proceeds owner to an escrow account in a federally insured bank
or savings and loan institution using a standard escrow document form.

(ii) The deposit shall earn interest at the highest rate being offered by that institution for the amount and term of similar
demand deposilc;.

(iii) The escrow agent may commingle money received into escrow from any one lessee or operator, purchaser, or other
person legally responsible for payment.

(iv) Payment of principal and accrued interest from the escrow account shall be made by the escrow agent to the person
legally entitled to them within 30 days from the date of receipt by the escrow agent of final legal determination of
entitlement to the payment.
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(v) Applicable escrow fees shall be deducted from the payments.

(4) Any person entilled to oil and gas proceeds may file a petition wilh Lhe board lo conduct a hearing to determine why the
proceeds have not been paid.

(5) Upon receipt of the petition, the board shall set the matter for investigation and negotiation by the division within 60 days.

(6)(a) lfthe matter cannot be resolved by negotiation as of that date, the board may set a hearing within 30 days.

(b) If the board does not set a hearing, any infonuation gathered during the investigation and negotiation shall be given to
the petitioner who may then seek a remedy in a court of competent jurisdiction.

(7)(a) If, after a hearing, the board finds the proceeds have not been deposited in an interest bearing escrow account in accordance
with Subsection (3), the board may order that:

(i) a complete accounting be made; and

(ii) the proceeds be subject to an interest rate of 1-1/2% per month, as a substitute for an escrow account interest rate,
accruing from the date the payment should have been suspended in accordance with Subsection (3).

(b) If, after a hearing, the board finds the delay of payment is without reasonable justification, the board may:

(i) if the proceeds have been deposited in an interest bearing escrow account in accordance with Subsection (3):

(A) order a complete accounting;

(B) require the proceeds and accruing interest to remain in the escrow account; and

(C) assess a penalty ofup to 25% of the total proceeds and interest in the escrow account; or

(ii) if the proceeds have not been deposited in an interest bearing escrow account in accordance with Subsection (3), assess
a penalty ofup to 25% oftbe total proce~<ls and interest as determined under Subsection (7)(a).

(c)(i) Upon finding that the delay of payment is without reasonable justification, the board shall set a date not later than 90
days from the hearing for final distribution of the total sum.

(ii) If payment is not made by the required date, the total proceeds, interest, and any penalty as provided in Subsection (7)
(b) shall be subject to interest at a rate of 1-1/2% per month until paid.
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(d) If, after a hearing, the board finds the delay of payment is with reasonable justification and the proceeds have been
deposited in an interest bearing escrow account in accordance with Subsection (3), the payor may not be required to make an
accounting or payment of appropriately suspended proceeds until the condition which justified suspension ha~ been satisfied.

vu

(8) The circumstances under which the board may find the suspension of payment of proceeds is made with reasonable
justification, such that the penalty provisions of Subsections (7)(b) and (7)(c)(ii) do not apply, include, but are not limited to,
the following:

(a) the payor:

(i) fails to make the payment in good faith reliance upon a title opinion by a licensed Utah attorney objecting to the lack
of good and marketable title of record of the person claiming entitlement to payment; and

(ii) furnishes a copy of the relevant portions of the opinion to the person for necessary curative action;

(b) the payor receives information which:

(i) in the payor's good faith judgmen4 brings into question the entitlement of the person claiming the right to the payment
to receive that payment;

(ii) has rendered the title unmarketable; or

(iii) may expose the payor to the risk of liability to third parties if the payment is made;

(c) the total amount of oil and gas proceeds in possession of the payor owed to the person making claim to payment is less
than $100 at the end of any month; or

(d) the person entitled to payment has failed or refused to execute a division or transfer order acknowledging the proper
interest to which the person claims to be entitled and setting forth the mailing address to which payment may be directed,
provided the division or transfer order does not alter or amend the terms of the lease.

(9) If the circumstances described in Subsection (8)(a) or (b) arise, the payor may:

(a) suspend and escrow the payments in accordance with Subsection (3); or

(b) at the request and expense of the person claiming entitlement to the paymen4 make the payment into court on an
interpleader action to resolve the claim and avoid liability under this chapter.
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Credits
Laws 1983, c. 205, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 86, § 2; Laws 1992, c. 34, § 4; Laws 1993, c. 151, § 1; Laws 20 I 0, c. 324, § 65, eff.
May 11, 2010.
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